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Abstract: Analytic philosophers are generally advised to steer clear of the 
substantive use of literary tropes whose ȁsemantic content outstrips their 
propositional contentȂ (Rea, 2009: 6). But this poses a problem for analytic 
theologians whose primary texts are beset by such literary devices. Can such 
material be usefully marshalled, or should it be left to one side, to remain 
unemployed by analytic theologians? In The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture 
Yoram Hazony offers what I take to be the most convincing argument to date 
that the entire biblical narrative (literary tropes and all) ought both to be read 
as philosophy and that the philosophical content contained in the biblical 
narrative can be marshalled into non-narrative propositional arguments. In 
this paper I will address three areas of concern for his project, and by 
extension, what I take to be concerns for other analytic theologians who might 
follow his lead.1  
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In the introduction to Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of 
Theology Michael Rea characterises analytic philosophy (and by extension, analytic 
theology2) as ȁavoiding substantive use of metaphor and other tropes whose 
semantic content outstrips their propositional content.Ȃ ǻǰȱŘŖŖşǱȱŜǼȱȂȱȱ ȱ
not that metaphor and other literary tropes (like typology or analogy) should be 
avoided completely Ȯ to do so would severely limit the primary source material 
available to the analytic theologian Ȯ rather, as Thomas McCall puts it, that analytic 
                                                            
1 This is not to say that all analytic theologians are committed to what I take to be Hazo¢Ȃȱȱ
(namely, that the entire Bible can be translated into propositional content). Far from it. Rather, 

£¢Ȃȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
£¢Ȃȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ could be taken by an 
analytic theologian, but, I argue, should not be. The concerns I raise, then, are perhaps best 
considered indicative of the limitations of analytic theology. 
2 There are, of course, philosophers working within the analytic tradition that do use literary 
narrative, for example Eleonore stump and Martha Nussbaum, but for present purposes I will treat 
these as non-representative. 
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ȁtheologians are not at liberty to trade loosely in metaphor without ever being able to 
specify just what is meant by those metaphors. They are not, then, free to make 
claims the meaning of which cannot be specified or spelled out.Ȃ (McCall, 2015: 20) In 
essence, although they can be identified as such, metaphors (and other literary 
tropes) should only be utilised by the analytic theologian if they can be rendered in 
some sense propositionally unambiguous. 
Such an expectation certainly seems fitting for work produced by so-called 
analytic theologians, however the question remains: how are analytic theologians to 
deal with the ambiguities of the metaphors, typologies and similar tropes already 
present in their primary texts? Should Christian or Jewish analytic theologians, for 
instance, gloss over the parts of the Biblical text that do not lend themselves to 
straightforward propositional analysis, or are they at liberty to assume that beyond 
the metaphors and other literary tropes the authors or final editors of the Biblical 
texts were (at the very least far more often than not) engaging in some coherent 
work that can be teased out and rendered propositionally unambiguous?3 
One analytic theologian who has engaged at length with this question is 
Yoram Hazony.4 Hazony affirms the latter position and in his book The Philosophy of 
Hebrew Scripture he sets out a methodological framework for how this work might be 
undertaken (at least, in Jewish analytic theology). Hazony argues that the Biblical 
prophets were engaging in works of reason, works at least comparable to the Greek 
philosophers, and that their work should be considered authoritative because it is 
reasonable, and not (just) because their work is taken on faith to have been revealed 
to them by God. Expanding upon this claim, Hazony begins his Ȃȱconclusion 
with the following words: 
 
ȃNot too long from now it may be possible to write a comprehensive work on the 
ideas of the Hebrew Scriptures. [This book suggests] a methodological framework 
[which] I believe can permit a more rapid advance in the direction of a well-
articulated understanding of the philosophical content of the Hebrew Scripture than 
 ȂȱȱȱǯȄȱ(Hazony, 2012: 265) 
 
                                                            
3 This is not to say that analytic theologians of the former persuasion are unable to say anything about 
such non-propositional content; as I hope to show, they can attempt to articulate why, in general 
terms, such non-propositional content might have been included. Neither indeed am I suggesting that 
analytic theology acts (or should act) as a replacement for direct engagement with the biblical text. 
Rather, this paper takes aim at those who take up the latter position and think the entire Bible can be 
translated into propositional content without left-over (regardless of whether or not this then serves 
as a supplement to direct-biblical engagement). And whilst it might be the case that such a group of 
analytic theologians is very small indeed (although if Kierkegaard is right, perhaps not so small! See 
Kierkegaard, 1990: 25-6) it is hoped this paper will be taken as an attempt to expand upon and 
exemplify motivations to take up the former position. I thank one anonymous referee for pushing this 
point. 
4 ȱȱȱȱȱ
£¢Ȃȱ ȱǻȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ
this question that I have come across), I think the concerns I raise would be common to any attempt 
by an analytic theologian to propositionally analyse the literary tropes in a religious text. 
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Reason, Hazony says, has traditionally involved ȁdeducing propositions from other 
propositions.Ȃ What he proposes instead is to extend this understanding of reason to 
include abductively inferring propositions from what he calls ȁnon-propositionalȂ 
analogy, metaphor, and typology found in the Hebrew bible (272).5 In essence, 
Hazony is proposing to take the very literary tropes at question, reduce them to 
what he sees as their approximate propositional content and then set them to work in 
analytic arguments in order to articulate what he sees as the philosophy of Hebrew 
scripture. 
The methodological framework that Hazony develops requires his inquirer to 
first learn how to reliably ȁrecognize a given general cause or nature in experienceȂ as 
only once this is done ȁis it then possible to begin trying to establish a partial 
description of it in propositionsȂ (272). Hazony follows this up by suggesting that as 
soon as one recognises that 
 
ȃmetaphor, analogy, and typology are in fact means by which the author of a 
work can establish positions with respect to general causes or natures, it 
becomes much easier to see that the great majority of the biblical authors, and 
perhaps all of them, are indeed engaged in reason; and that it is the exercise of 
reason they hope for, as well, in their readers.Ȅ (273) 
 
Now, let me say at the outset that I am in point of fact in sympathetic to 
£¢Ȃ 
position. I find his suggestion that metaphor, analogy, and typology can be used by 
an author to establish positions with respect to general causes or natures a deeply 
plausible one.6 Like Hazony, I think that not too long from now it may be possible to 
compile a comprehensive work on the ideas of Hebrew Scripture. Nevertheless, I 
have three concerns that have to do with the attempt to disseminate such a 
comprehensive analytic work, should 
£¢Ȃȱ be in fact possible.  
Each of my three concerns relates to the presentation of such a work if, as Rea 
and McCall suggest should be the case for the analytic theologian, whatever literary 
tropes that are present in this work are entirely reducible to propositional content 
and especially if this comprehensive work is presented in a purely non-narrative 
propositional form. To that end, this paper should not be read as an indictment 
against 
£¢Ȃȱ¢ȱ Ȯ far from it; rather, it is best read as an expression 
of concern as to the direction the project might take if clarity and rigor are placed on 
too high a pedestal (literary trope intended!) to the exclusion of narrative 
presentation.7 I will briefly outline these concerns before returning to each in turn in 
sections two, three and four.   
                                                            
5 See also Hazony, 2012: 27. 
6 Although this view is not uncontroversial. See for instance Brinks, 2015: 247. 
7 As one anonymous reviewer pointed out, analytic theology is only a supplement to, rather than a 
replacement for, direct biblical engagement. 
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Firstly, metaphor, analogy, and typology are all modes of narrative. 
Following a line of argument developed by Eleonore Stump, I will argue that 
narratives (including metaphor, analogy, and typology) convey knowledge that 
cannot be communicated in non-narrative propositional form. As a result, there is a 
real risk of losing something in trying to convey in non-narrative propositional form 
the ideas of the Hebrew Scripture in some comprehensive work of analytic 
theology.8 
Secondly, I will propose one reason why the philosophy in Hebrew Scripture 
might have been ȁhiddenȂ in metaphor, analogy, and typology. To do this I am going 
to discuss a pedagogical strategy used by another author, Thomas Hobbes, who 
used the paradoxes of Hebrew Scripture to inspire puzzlement, awe and wonder in 
his readers. I will argue that there may be good pedagogical reasons why philosophy 
might be hidden in metaphor, analogy, and typology, namely, that the experience of 
puzzlement, awe and wonder allows the reader to enter into ȱ ȁȱȂ 
and that this moment is lost when one spells out in non-narrative propositional form 
what might have been buried in a seemingly ambiguous narrative. 
Finally, I will argue that it is often the case that coming to some sort of an 
understanding of the Hebrew Scriptures requires (quite deliberately) wrestling with 
them.9 In this wrestling process one gains a certain experiential knowledge of what it 
is like to wrestle with the text, and behind the text, perhaps with the One who 
inspired it also. I will argue that the sort of experiential knowledge gained in the 
wrestling process as one wrestles with the narrative is lost when whatever can be 
gleaned from the narrative is given to you on a plate, if you will, in easy to digest 
non-narrative propositional form.  
 
I. Narrative and Two Kinds of Knowledge 
 
So, to the first concern. I see 
£¢Ȃ project as having two broad aims:  
  
i. To encourage people to read the whole Hebrew Bible as a philosophical 
narrative, and 
ii. To break down metaphors, analogies, and typologies found in Biblical 
narrative into clear propositional arguments in order to help comprehensively 
map out philosophical ideas in the Hebrew Bible.10 
                                                            
8 ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
£¢Ȃȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  all analytic 
theologians are committed to conveying every idea of the Bible in non-narrative prose. Rather, as I 
will suggest, the analytic theologian needs merely (if needs anything at all) to identify areas 
irreducible to non-narrative prose and explain why (and perhaps how) such passages are irreducible 
to non-narrative prose. I thank an anonymous referee for pushing this point. 
9 This is, of course, not unique to the Bible, however few other books can claim a similar architect. 
10 Much of the remainder ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ 
£¢Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ
committed to this point in all cases, or only when and where possible, and to the degree that it is 
ǯȱ ȱ 
£¢Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ 
£¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ceeding 
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Both these aims require extracting knowledge from (sometimes very complex) 
narrative, and in both cases there is a long history of people not even knowing to 
look, let alone how to look. To this end, I think the work Hazony has done in 
showing that (at least parts of) the Hebrew Scripture can be read as a philosophical 
narrative is laudable. My concern, however, is that something is lost when these 
narratives are reduced to non-narrative propositional arguments.11  
On page twenty-one of The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture Hazony cites 
ȱ Ȃȱ ǰȱ Wandering in Darkness, as being the first book by a 
prominent philosopher to argue for the need to incorporate the biblical narrative into 
the discipline of philosophy.  
In Wandering in Darkness Stump makes a distinction between two kinds of 
knowledge (2010: 59), what she calls propositional knowledge (or Dominican 
knowledge) and what she calls knowledge of persons (or Franciscan knowledge): 
 
x Propositional knowledge is knowledge that X, and as such, propositional 
knowledge can always be reduced to and conveyed by propositions.  
x Knowledge of persons, on the other hand, is knowledge irreducible to 
propositional form. Unlike propositional knowledge, knowledge of persons 
can only be conveyed through second-personal experience or, and crucially 
for present purposes, narrative. 12  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
ǰȱ  ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ 
£¢Ȃȱ ȱ ǻȱ ¢ȱǼȱ ȱ ǲȱ ȁǰȱ
analogy and typology can be broken down into propositional argument only if they can be broken 
down into propositional argument, and then only to the deȱȱ¢ȱȂǯȱ
 ȱȱȱ¢ȱ
theologian determine whether the metaphor, analogy or typology they are looking at can be broken 
down? If it is not immediately obvious that what they are looking at can be broken down, when do 
they move on? At what point do they risk pure speculative eisegesis (something already a problem on 
 ȱȱȱȱȱ
£¢Ȃȱ Ǽǵȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǯ 
11 Of course, this is not to say that analytic theology is in any sense thought to replace, rather than 
supplement, direct engagement with the biblical text, rather, that this is one reason why analytic 
theology could not replace direct engagement with the biblical text, and one reason to doubt the 
¢ȱȱ
£¢Ȃȱȱȱȱ omprehensive non-narrative map of the philosophy of Hebrew 
scripture. 
12 See Stump, 2010: 77-80 for an explanation for how an account can be second-personal. Stump writes: 
ȃWhile we cannot express the distinctive knowledge of such an experience as a matter of knowing 
ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
Ȭȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
the Franciscan knowledge garnered from the experience is also available to them. This is generally 
 ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬȱ¡ȱȱ
one sort or another and makes it available to a wider audience to share. It does so by making it 
possible, to one degree or another, for a person to experience some of what she would have 
¡ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ
That is, a story gives a person some of what she would have had if she had had unmediated personal 
interaction with the characters in the story while they were conscious and interacting with each other, 
 ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱȱȬȱȱȱȬȱ¡ȱ
in a story thus constȱȱȬȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬȱ¡ȱ
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This is how Stump describes, or more precisely, does not describe knowledge of 
persons: 
 
ȃAt this point, it is worth considering how this question [what is the nature of 
knowledge of persons?] could be answered. Here is how it could not be answered. It 
could not be answered by trying to spell out what exactly is known in the Franciscan 
knowledge of persons, contrasting it with knowledge that, and considering whether 
the distinctive elements of that Franciscan knowledge are philosophically significant. 
The objector's question could not be answered in this way because then the position 
being defended would be incoherent... I would be trying to describe in the familiar 
terms of knowing that the Franciscan knowledge which I have claimed cannot be 
formulated in that way.Ȅ (Stump, 2010: 59)13 
 
In order to support the distinction between these two types of knowledge Stump 
 ȱȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱǯȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ
some Mary who has been locked in a room since birth. Mary has never experienced a 
second-personal encounter with her mother, and does not have access to any 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ
(through encyclopaedias and computers) to all relevant non-narrative propositional 
information about the existence of her loving mother, along with all that science can 
teach about her. Stump writes: 
 
ȃWhen Mary is first united with her mother, it seems indisputable that Mary will 
know things she did not know before, even if she knew everything about her mother 
that could be made available to her iȱȬȱȱǰȱȱȱ
mother's psychological states. Although Mary knew that her mother loved her before 
she met her, when she is united with her mother, Mary will learn what it is like to be 
loved. And this will be new for her, even if in her isolated state she had as complete a 
scientific description as possible of what a human being feels like when she senses that 
she is loved by someone else.Ȅ (Stump, 2010: 52) 
 
On my reading of her, what Stump is committing to in this account of knowledge is 
at odds with, for instance, a traditional ¢ȱ ȱ Ȃ original thought 
experiment that suggests Mary merely learns something old in a new way (see, for 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ǽȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
experiences.Ȅ (78) 
13 And again a little earlier Stump writes: ȃI want to claim, however, that there is a kind of knowledge 
ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ  ǰȱ  ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
knowledge that. What could that possibly be?, a skeptical objector may ask. But, of course, if I give an 
answer to the skeptic's question, I will have an incoherent position: in answering the question, I will 
be presenting in terms of knowledge that what I am claiming could not be presented that way.Ȅ 
(Stump, 2010: 52) 
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instance, Churchland, 1985: 67-76).14 In other words, knowledge of persons (the 
something new) is in some sense captured by what was previously known, namely, 
pertinent propositional knowledge (the something old).  For Stump, on the other 
hand, what Mary learns is not something old in a new way, but something entirely 
new altogether.15 
So why might this matter to us?  Stump continues in her account of narrative in 
the following way, arguing in effect that knowledge of persons transmitted in her 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ȱ  Ȃȱ ȱ ȁȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ
arguȱ ȱ  ǯȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ Ȃȱ
explain exactly how this knowledge of persons does this, nevertheless Stump writes 
 
ȃȱǽǾȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȬȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ
of what we would have had if we ourselves had been participants, even just as 
¢ǰȱȱȱȬȱ¡ȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱȱȱȱ ¢ǰ 
ǳ biblical narratives ǳconstitute a way of sharing and passing on interpersonal 
experiences, including interpersonal experiences (whether real or imagined) with God, 
in all their messy richness. These narratively shared experiences can inform in subtle 
ways ouȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȬȱ¡ȱǯ 
ǳȱȱȱ¡ȱ¡¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǳ16 
                                                            
14 Churchland writes, for instance, ȃthe difference between a person who knows all about the visual 
cortex but has never enjoyed a sensation of red, and a person who knows no neuroscience but knows 
well the sensation of red, may reside not in what is respectively known by each (brain states by the 
former, qualia by the latter), but rather in the different type of knowledge each has of exactly the same 
thing. The difference is in the manner of the knowing, not in the nature(s) of the thing known.Ȅ 
(Churchland, 1989: 24) 
15 See Stump, 2010: 52-59 for morȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȁ -of-Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ
ȁ - Ȃȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ǻŗşşŖǼǰȱ ȱ  ȱ ǻŘŖŖŚǼȱ ȱ ȱ
Churchill (1989) discuss. The knowledge-how ability hypothesis suggests that experience gives us an 
ability and nothing more; an ability to remember, imagine or recognize what it is like to have that 
experience. There is no new knowledge gained at all in this process. The position that Stump takes up, 
ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȁȂȱ ¢esis (1994). For Conee, there is no new 
propositional knowledge gained by experience, but there is something gained beyond mere know-
how, namely, acquaintance with the thing known. 
16 Further from Stump on this point: ȃWhat an American learns after numerous extended trips to 
China cannot be reduced to particular claims about the country, the culture, and the people; the 
experienced traveler will not be able to explain in numbered propositions what his previous trips 
have taught him. But, nonetheless, what virtually all of us believe is that, on his next trip to China, he 
will be readily distinguishable from his colleagues who are visiting China for the first time.  
He will be able to bridge the gap between American and Chinese cultures by myriad small or large 
insights hard to summarize or to express at all in any propositional way. Because of his previous 
experience with China, he will have an understanding of China and its culture and people that his 
colleagues on their first trip to China will lack; and he will not be able to convey to them in terms of 
knowledge that what he himself has learned. His inexperienced colleagues will have to learn it for 
themselves through experience on their own trips to China. Or they might learn some of it in advance 
through stories, which lets them participate vicariously to some extent in the experiences their 
colleague, the experienced traveler to China, has had.Ȅ (Stump, 2010: 374) 
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ȱǰȱǰȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǳȱȱȱǳȱȱȱȱǳȱ
reflection on them ǳȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ
traveling through a country but rather something like the experience of immersion in a 
worldview. To experience this worldview is, of course, not the same thing as 
approving of it or being willing to adopt and accept as one's own the things peculiar to 
ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȬȬ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱȇȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȬȬ
subtle ways, much as travel to a very different culture will do even if one is alienated 
from that culture. 
ǳȱȱ  [therefore] ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱǯȱǳȱȱ ȱȱ
the memory of the preceding readings of the stories inform inchoately or tacitly the 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱǳȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
common store of experience shared by readers, in the way one might share with others 
the experience of having been to China, even if one disagrees with one's fellow 
travelers about the assessment of what one has seen, even if one disputes what the 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȄ (2010: 374) 
 
Now, it might be the case that Hazony is right, and with sufficient study we can 
extract all non-narrative propositional knowledge from the analogies, metaphors, 
and typologies in the Bible (although Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ  on how we would 
judge what qualifies as true typology and what a false typology). In passing this 
information on to others, however, there is a real risk that analytic theologians will 
fail to transmit the sort of knowledge of persons that the authors or final editors of 
the Hebrew Bible were at least in part concerned with passing on.17 On this view, 
then, metaphor, analogy, and typology are not mere rhetorical flair, nor are they 
¢ȱȱȱ ȱ ȁȱ ȱ Ȃ of an argument, rather, the knowledge of 
persons gathered from them is necessary for, or at the very least conducive to, full 
understanding of the point under consideration.18 
                                                            
17 This, of course, assumes that there is such a thing as propositionally irreducible Franciscan 
knowledge of persons, and this is by no means an uncontroversial assumption. Even assuming this, 
though, Hazony (or the putative analytic theologian) could respond to this by suggesting that the 
propositional content he extracts is merely a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, the Biblical 
¡ȱ ȱ ǻȁȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ - I 
thank one anonymous referee for pressing this point). However, this move (conceding that second-
personal content in the Bible is there, but cannot be marshalled for use in argument) demonstrates one 
limitation of analytic theology, for in making this move the analytic theologian is ignoring something 
that might otherwise prove pertinent to the topic at hand. Such a concession is of course neither good 
nor bad for analytic theology (nor should it really come as a surprise), but is, I suggest, usefully 
illustrative of ȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȁȱȱȱȂǯ 
18 ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ
exactly how Franciscan knowledge might do this (for to do so would require setting out what it 
achieves in propositional form, which, of course, would then render such knowledge propositional 
rather than knowledge of persons). At best, I can point to the Mary thought experiment and use the 
intuition that some may have that Mary really does learn something new when she sees her mother to 
show that knowledge of persons is real, and can be communicated in narrative.  
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If this knowledge of persons cannot (by necessity) be reduced to non-
narrative propositional form, the methodology for engaging in a project to 
comprehensively and persuasively map out the ideas of the Hebrew Scriptures must 
be carefully revised, with consideration given, at the very least, for (ambiguous) 
Ȃȱ 19  in analytic theology.20 As I will note a little later Ȯ the analytic 
theology project is edifying for those doing it, and edifying for those it inspires to 
search on their own (both of whom get the benefit of the propositional and non-
propositional knowledge that comes with engaging with scripture), but it is perhaps 
not so good for those who upon reading the finished (non-narrative) article think to 
ȱ ȁȂȱȱȮ Ȃȱȱ ȱȂȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǷȂ21 (and 
who are thereby left with propositional knowledge alone).22 
 
II. Literary Tropes as a Pedagogical Tool  
 
So my first concern was to do with the possibility and plausibility of 
conveying arguments derived from narrative in a purely non-narrative form. I have 
                                                            
19 I am here referring to whatever it is about narrative that is in some sense propositionally 
irreducible. 
20 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȂȱWandering in Darkness provides an excellent model for how such biblically 
informed analytic theology might be done, with a full quarter of the book devoted letting the biblical 
narrative speak for itself, if you will (albeit after her propositional framework has been established, so 
reader comes to the narrative with an informed structure already present).  
21 As one anonymous referee noted, apart from perhaps Maimonides, there is perhaps no other 
analytic (or non-analytic) theologian, in either the Jewish or Christian tradition, who has endorsed 
this kind of response. However, the concern here is not so much that this response is endorsed (or 
not) by theologians (although it seems to me to be a plausible outcome among other plausible 
outcomes), rather, the concern is that analytic theology alone cannot provide a comprehensive map of 
the ideas of scripture, and so the analytic theologian must either leave something important out, or 
¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȁmetaphor and other tropes whose semantic 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ǻǰȱ ŘŖŖşǱȱ ŜǼȱ ȁ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ
 ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȂȱǻǰȱŘŖŗśǱȱŘŖǼ 
22 For a different (and slightly more extreme) take on why this might be problematic see, for instance, 
the following Chinese proverb by Chuang Tzu: ȃȱ
ȱȱȂȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
end of the hall; the wheelwright was making a wheel at the lower end. Putting aside his mallet and 
chisel, he called to the Duke and asked him what book ȱ ȱǯȱȁȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ
ȱ ǰȂȱ  ȱ ȱǯȱ ȁȱ ȱ ȱ ǵȂȱ ȱ ȱ  ǯȱ ȁǰȱ ǰȂȱ ȱ ȱ
ǰȱȁ¢ȱȱǯȂȱȁȱȱǰȂȱȱȱ  ǰȱȁ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
the lees ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱǯȂȱ ȁ
 ȱȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ  ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
ǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ¢ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǯȂȱ ȁȱȱ ȱ
  ǰȂȱȱǰȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ǲȱ ȱ am making a wheel, if my stroke is 
too slow, then it bites deep but is not steady; if my stroke is too fast, then it is steady, but it does not 
go deep. The right pace, neither slow nor fast, cannot get into the hand unless it comes from the heart.  
It is a thing that cannot be put into rules; there is an art in it that I cannot explain to my son. That is 
why it is impossible for me to let him take over my work, and here I am at the age of seventy still 
making wheels. In my opinion it must have been the same with the men of old. All that was worth 
handing on, died with them; the rest, they put in their books. That is why I said that what you were 
reading was thȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȄȱ(Oakeshott, 1962: 9) 
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a second concern, too. I think there is a sense in which analogy, metaphor, and 
typology can also be used as pedagogical tools for learning, and by explaining them 
too clearly too soon, the power of this tool is lost.23 To illustrate this point I will draw 
a parallel between the use of the pedagogical power of metaphor, analogy and 
typology in the British philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, and my suggested use of the 
same pedagogical tools in the Hebrew Scriptures. 
The seventeenth Century British Philosophy Thomas Hobbes saw one of his 
major tasks as being that of public education. His work (he hoped) would educate 
the public to think in a certain way Ȯ and he employed a very specific pedagogical 
strategy in order to achieve this aim. 
Hobbes believed that in the presence of paradox or puzzlement, the Ȃȱ
attention would be arrested. Their curiosity would be piqued, and this curiosity 
would lead to wonder and admiration, where the sense of admiration was that of 
intellectual activity suspended under the influence of emotion. In such a state, the 
reader would be able develop their knowledge in a way not previously possible.  
Most people, Hobbes thought, are stuck in a sort of rut of habituated thinking; like a 
wooden carriage on a well-worn mud track. The wheels of the carriage find 
themselves in deep and familiar grooves from which it is difficult to turn. In the 
same way, a person (here the carriage wheel) is not likely to change their engrained 
of thinking about the world without some mental shock or jolt.24 
The employment of a paradox, a riddle or, other puzzlement was designed, 
on Hobbes account, to shake that person out of their tracks, to shock them, to throw 
them for a loop, and to cause that person to have to think for themselves Ȯ no longer 
on autopilot, so to speak. And it is in this state that Hobbes believed a person has the 
capacity to learn something new. 

Ȃȱ ȱHobbes Scholar Jon Parkin puts it: 
 
ȃThe clear connection between paradox and wonder now starts to make sense of 

Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ
deliberately paradoxical form, Hobbes seems to have adopted a writing strategy that 
was precisely calibrated to generate a sense of admiration and wonder in his reader, 
which we know from his reception that it did. Far from providing a straightforward 
elaboration of his arguments in an appeal to the rational faculties, Hobbes appears to 
                                                            
23 Talking about the importance of having an attitude of awe for holiness, Samuel Lebens suggests 
that awe is an easy bubble to burst Ȯ you can make any situation seem absurd, he suggests, if you 
start treating things as mere objects. (Lebens, 2013) Whilst neither Hazony nor any other analytic 
theologian I am aware of argues that analytic theology should replace direct engagement with the 
Bible, it is evidently the case that work in analytic theology can affect how one directly engages with 
the Bible, especia¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȁȱ ȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
 ȱȂǷȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻer impossibile!) succeed, or purports to succeed, 
in reducing narrative, metaphor, and typology to non-narrative propositional form in such a way that 
they provide a comprehensive ethical explanation for, say, the Akedah, they do so at the risk of losing 
a teachable moment, or so I suggest. 
24 I thank Jon Parkin for this analogy. 
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ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ
admirationǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ
Ȃȱ¢ȱȱ
 ǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ
Ȃȱ
artificial intellectual novelties might resolve itself into some level of excited curiosity 
into the possibility of new and beneficial knowledge.Ȅ (Parkin, 2016: 635) 
 
Of course, this insight was not unique to Hobbes. Today, too, when we find 
ourselves reading about a God who demands Abraham sacrifice his son, or for what 
appears to be genocide, or what might otherwise seem an utterly arbitrary law, the 
correct response, I think, is that of horror (ȁȱȂȱȱǷȂ) or surprise (ȁthis is 
bizarre!Ȃ) and a desire to inquire further into the topic at hand. 
I suggest that this same pedagogical tool employed by Hobbes to such clear 
effect might also have been employed by the authors or final editors of the Hebrew 
Scriptures. The metaphors, analogies, typologies and even paradoxes of the Hebrew 
Scripture seem geared up ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱȂǯȱȱȱ ȱupon 
discovery and puzzlement, a person wants to inquire further, and is then particularly 
receptive to any knowledge they find on the way.25 
My concern, then, is that in explaining the paradox, or metaphor, or analogy, 
or type in non-narrative propositional form, the analytic theologian loses a powerful 
pedagogical tool Ȯ in a sense it is like giving away a spoiler in a mystery, or the 
punchline in a joke. Instead of wonder and admiration, then, the reader is left with 
ȱ ££ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁǯȱ Ȃȱ ǯȂȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
elsewhere.  
Now there is a sense in which any attempt at explanatory theology runs the 
risk of having a similar effect, and I am, of course, by no means suggesting this then 
ought to be avoided; rather, I am merely suggesting that this initial unclarity and 
subsequent puzzlement is a valuable (and deliberate) tool, and is something not to 
be jettisoned too lightly. 
 
III. Reading as Wrestling: Experiencing the Word of God 
 
So I have given two concerns about the possibility and plausibility of 
conveying arguments derived from narrative in non-narrative propositional form, 
and about the loss of an important pedagogical tool in giving the punch line away, if 
you will, too soon. 
I think, however, that there is a much bigger issue at stake than either of these 
Ȯ but at this juncture my concern becomes less about an ambiguously secular 
enterprise and more clearly a religious one. 
On my reading, the God of the Hebrew Bible takes joy in concealing things 
and takes joy when these concealed things are searched out. Consider the following          
verse from Proverbs (25:2): ȃIt is the glory of God to conceal a matter; to search out a 
                                                            
25 For an example of this in the biblical narrative see the interaction between Nathan and David in 2 
Samuel 12:1-4. 
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matter is the glory of kings.Ȅ And I think there is an important reason why this 
might be the case. I suggest that in the very act of searching God out there is 
untransmittable ȁ ȱ ȱ Ȃ available Ȯ and what is true of searching 
God out is true also when it comes to uncovering the meaning behind the 
metaphors, analogies, and typologies of Hebrew Scripture. 
In their paper ȁȱȱȱȂȱȱ	ȱȱȱ 
argue that the Christian and Hebrew Scriptures offer a vehicle for what they call 
ȱ ȁshared attentionȂ ǻȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ ȁȂ26) with God (Green and 
Quan, 2012). Their point seems to me right, but I think mere shared attention alone 
does not do the sort of second-personal encounter actually available justice. I think 
something altogether more dramatic can happen as a person wrestles with the 
Scriptures.  
Speaking from experience, when I read through parts of Deuteronomy (2:34, 
3:6, 7:2, 13:15, 20:16-ŗŝǼȱȱȱǻŜǱŘŗǰȱŗŖǱŚŖǼȱȱȱ	Ȃȱȱȱȱ
children, I feel visceral shock and horror. 
There are several responses I could have at this juncture. I could devise some 
clever justification in order to explain my horror away, or I could try and ignore 
what I have read, chalking it up as a mystery beyond my comprehension. Or I, like 
many before me, could confront God over why he would do or command such a 
thing.27 Indeed, the Hebrew Scripture has several exemplar cases of people 
struggling with GodȮ Abraham and Lot (Genesis 18:16-33), Jacob (Genesis 32:22-33), 
Moses (Exodus 32:11) Ȯ and whilst we also have our own lived experience, I see no 
reason why we cannot wrestle with God today over that which has been previously 
recorded.28 
So I suggest that this very experience of struggling or wrestling with God 
while searching for answers is valuable Ȯand I think something significant would be 
lost if this experience was bypassed by knowledge imparted without any mental 
struggle. God could have renamed Jacob without the need to wrestle with him. But I 
think in wrestling with God, Jacob learned something about himself, and about God, 
                                                            
26 See Green and Quan, 2012: 423. Green and Quan write: ȃIt is our suggestion that the Christian 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȃȱǰȄȱǰȱ
and constitutive uses of the religious text.Ȅ (426) 
27 This motivation to wrestle need not be limited to outlier extremes like moral horrors. The feeling of 
puzzlement one has when one comes across a literary trope and one really cannot determine why it 
was included, or what it is trying to convey is just as sufficient a motivation to turn to God in 
perplexity. 
28 ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱȁȱ ȱȱȂǰȱ
Isaiah 54:9, see Zohar on Genesis, p67bǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ 	Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ
destroy the world with water. Likewise, there is a similar tradition that holds Abraham at fault for 
disintegration of his relationship with Isaac after the Akedah (one tradition believes Abraham went 
back to Sarah alone, Genesis 22:19, with the two of them either never seeing each other again, or 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ
had done with Lot and as he was positioning himself to do over Ishmael, when God asked him to 
sacrifice Isaac. 
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that he could not otherwise have learned. In a similar vein, if someone was to give 
me a completely satisfying answer as to why God asked Abraham to sacrifice his 
son, I would have (perhaps) one less issue with God, but I would also have lost an 
opportunity to engage, passionately, with God.29 
So in the process of discovery itself, there is knowledge of persons of God and 
oneself to be had. And this experiential knowledge cannot be attained without in 
some sense personally going through this process of discovery. 
Perhaps, indeed, actually understanding the Hebrew Scripture is only a 
happy side effect of a much more significant reason for engagement with the Biblical 
narratives: namely, the opportunity to come into a passionate conversation, a 
dramatic second-personal encounter, with God. One where a person can come to a 
text confused, angry, and upset, and indeed perhaps still leave confused, angry, and 
upset Ȯ but nevertheless having had that second-personal experience of addressing, 
and in some sense wrestling with God - with this engagement having been 
motivated and animated by the rich literary complexities and moral ambiguity of the 
narrative.30 
In ȱ ȱȱȱȂȱWandering in Darkness David Efird and I noted 
the following about the way suffering ȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȂȱ -
personal encounter with God: 
 
                                                            
29 As noted by one anonymous referee, just because Hazony tries to offer a satisfying answer to this 
question does not mean that all other analytic theologians are bound to the same course. This much is 
true, of course. An analytic theologian could produce a commentary on the Bible that leaves out 
difficult passages, explaining (with analytical philosophical justification) that these passages are left 
for the reader to wrestle over. H ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱ ǰȱǰȱ ȱȱ ȱ
£¢Ȃȱ
project to comprehensively map out all the ideas of scripture either cannot or, disconcertingly, should 
not be done.  
30 This was, I think, what Kierkegaard was getting at in his For Self-Examination, when he wrote that 
ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȁ	ȂȱȂ: ȃ"God's 
Word" is indeed the mirror-but, but-oh, how enormously complicated-strictly speaking, how much 
belongs to "God's Word"? Which books are authentic? Are they really by the apostles, and are the 
apostles really trustworthy? Have they personally seen everything, or have they perhaps only heard 
about various things from others? As for ways of reading, there are thirty thousand different ways. 
And then this crowd or crush of scholars and opinions, and learned opinions and unlearned opinions 
about how the particular passage is to be understood . . . . . is it not true that all this seems to be rather 
complicated! God's Word is the mirror-in reading it or hearing it, I am supposed to see myself in the 
mirror-but look, this business of the mirror is so confusing that I very likely never come to see myself 
reflected-at least not if I go at it this way. One could almost be tempted to assume that the full force of 
human craftiness has a hand in it (alas, how true, in relation to God and godliness and Godfearing 
truth we humans are so crafty that we do not mean it at all when we tell each other that we are 
perfectly willing to do God's will if we only could find out what it is). One could almost be tempted to 
assume that this is craftiness, that we really do not want to see ourselves in that mirror and therefore 
we have concocted all this that threatens to make the mirror impossible, all this that we then honor 
with the laudatory name of scholarly and profound and serious research and pondering.Ȅ 
(Kierkegaard, 1990: 25-6) 
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ȃThink about the last time you took an aeroplane flight and sat next to a stranger. You 
might have exchanged some pleasantries with the person sitting next to you, but it is 
not likely you took the conversation much deeper than that. And so you probably 
ended the flight strangers to one another, just as you were when you began the flight. 
Now, say that something terrible happens on the aeroplane, a traumatic ordeal that 
forces you to drop your guard and open up to the other person. Such an occasion is an 
occasion for your life-story to be interwoven with the life-story of the person who was 
once a stranger but now no more. For the two of you are then dealing with one 
another in a second-person way, focusing not merely on yourself (a first-person 
¡Ǽȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȁȂȱȱȁȂȱȱȱ
ȱȁ¢Ȃǯȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ	ȱȱȱ ȱȱ
in a second-person way, where we become open to God in a way that we would not 
ordinarily open up to him, just like we would not ordinarily open up to strangers, and 
in the trauma, our life-story becomes interwoven with God's.Ȅ (Efird & Worsley, 2015: 
550) 
 
I suspect being presented with a difficult narrative Ȯ a difficult narrative with no 
easy explanation - can do similar work to the suffering in the airplane thought 
experiment. There is a sense in which complexity and ambiguity forces a person to 
critically engage with God; to demand of Him an answer, to question His goodness, 
or to question His plan. And in as much as this may be true of suffering, I have no 
reason to doubt that it is also true in the face of an ambiguous or difficult narrative, 
too.31 
And it is just this dramatic second-personal engagement that will be lost, I 
think, if a comprehensive mapping of the philosophy of Scripture, including its 
ethics, takes place without a full appreciation of the rationale behind why said 
philosophy was cloaked in literary tropes to begin with. As before, however, this 
concern is not for those doing the project of understanding and disseminating itself Ȯ 
for as mentioned earlier, to ȁsearch out a matter is the glory of kingsȂ! 
 
Conclusion  
 
My concern, then, has been that assuming its possibility, the dissemination of a 
comprehensive map of the Philosophy of the Hebrew Bible may have at least three 
drawbacks, one practical, one pedagogical, the other experiential. These are only 
concerns, however. And I am well aware they may not amount to much in the end.32 
                                                            
31 Through a discussion of several Biblical characters who challenged God, Hazony, in the fourth 
chapter of his book, also notes that God wants people to wrestle with Him. (Hazony, 2012: 103-139). 
Hazony concludes: ȃSuffice it to say that the God of Israel loves those who disobey for the sake of 
what is right, and is capable of being pleased when a man has used his freedom to wrestle with him 
and to prevail, so long as the path on behalf of which he struggles ultimately proves to be the right 
one in GoȂȱ¢ǯȄ (139)  
32 As I see it, each concern serves to reinforce the thought that analytic theology supplements, rather 
than replaces, direct Biblical engagement, but this is not a particularly profound claim! 
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It might be the case that, as Hazony suggests (272), the clarity achieved in 
completing this project is sufficient to outweigh any pedagogical confusion, or that 
the clarity offered is enough to draw people to the Biblical narratives who would 
otherwise be disinterested. And indeed, it likely will still be the case that most 
Ȃȱȱȱ  the Scripture will be unaided, so to speak, and so they 
may still reap the ȱȂ pedagogical reward. 
The concerns I have briefly laid out do not entail that 
£¢Ȃ vision should not be 
attempted, ȱȱȱ Ȃȱȱȱȱ taking it on Ȯ I suspect there will 
be, especially to those undertaking the task Ȯ my overall concern is rather that 
whatever analytic methodology is employed in philosophically marshalling the 
ambiguous literary tropes present in the Biblical narratives, those readers not part of 
the marshalling process should still be (perhaps fully) exposed to the difficult, 
complex and often unclear narratives so that they too can experience the 
propositionally irreducible knowledge of persons available in the narrative, and so 
that they too can benefit from wrestling with the word of God.33 
 
Bibliography: 
 
BRINKS, C. L. (2014). ȃȱ ȱ ȱ 
£¢ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ 
 ȱ
ȄȱȱThe Journal of Analytic Theology 4:238-249.  
CHURCHLAND, P. (1989). ȃ  ǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ȅǰȱ ȱ A 
Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) pp. 67Ȯ76. 
CHURCHLANDǰȱ ǯȱ ǻŗşŞşǼǯȱ ȁ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ A 
Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT) pp. 67Ȯ76. 
CONEEǰȱǯȱ ǻŗşşŚǼǯȱ ȁȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱAustralasian Journal of Philosophy. 
72 (2): pp. 136Ȯ150. 
EFIRD, D. & WORSLEY, D (2015). ȃȱ ȱȱȱȇȱȱȱ
Ǳȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȄȱ ȱPhilosophical Quarterly 
65 (260):547-558. 
GREEN, A. & QUANǰȱ ǯȱ ǯȱ ǻŘŖŗŘǼǯȱ ȃȱ ȱ ȱ Ȅȱ ȱ Faith and 
Philosophy 29 (4):416-430. 
HAZONY, Y. (2012). The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
KIERKEGAARD, S. (1990). For Self Examination & Judge for Yourself trans. Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
LEBENSǰȱ ǯȱ ǻŘŖŗřǼǯȱ ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢Ǳȱ ȱ ¡ȱ  ȱ
ȄȱȱInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (3):315-332. 
                                                            
33 My gratitude is extended to the members of the 2015 Jewish Philosophy Theology Workshop who 
commented on an early draft of this paper, and also to the anonymous reviewers for this journal, who 
provided many invaluable insights. 
DAVID WORSLEY 
16 
 
LEWISǰȱǯȱǻŘŖŖŚǼǯȱȁȱ¡ȱȂȱȱ ǰȱǰȱ ǰȱȱȱǰȱ
D. Ȃȱȱ Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank 
Ȃ Knowledge Argument (Cambridge, MA: MIT) pp. 77-104. 
MCCALL, T. (2015). An Invitation to Analytic Theology (Illinois: InterVarsity Press). 
NEMIROWǰȱǯȱ ǻŗşşŖǼǯȱ ȁ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ ȱMind 
and Cognition: A Reader, ed. by W. Lycan (Oxford: Blackwells). 
OAKESHOTT, M. (1962) Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (London: Methuen & 
Co Ltd.). 
PARKIN, J. (2016). "Hobbes and Paradox" in The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes (Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press) pp. 624-642. 
REA, M. C. & CRISP, O. D. (eds.) (2009). Analytic Theology: New Essays in the 
Philosophy of Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
STUMP, E. (2010). Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
